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Abstract
This thesis considers quantitative tools for assessing concentration risks in credit portfolios that may underlie
decision making in an active portfolio management setting. The study incorporates a literature review,
which considers analytical and simulation based credit risk models in a Merton-type framework as well as
aspects of credit portfolio management. The literature review is followed by a numerical analysis in which
the credit risk models are evaluated with respect to accuracy and computational efficiency and the results
suggests that the simulations based models are suitable for being incorporated into an active portfolio
management framework in the setting tested.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Problem Description
This thesis, written in co-operation with Danske Bank in Copenhagen, Denmark, aims to
evaluate quantitative methods which may be used for actively managing the corporate and
institutional banking portfolio of Danske Bank.
In contrast to retail banking portfolios, credit portfolios consisting of corporate and in-
stitutional clients tend to be characterized by large exposures to a relatively small set of
counter-parties. This may give rise to effects of concentration with respect to single entities,
industries and geographical regions and thus cause expenses in a risk/return perspective
as well as with regards to the level of economic capital needed for supporting the portfolio.
Although Danske Bank is a global bank with presence in several northern European mar-
kets, possibilities of solely building a diversified corporate and institutional banking port-
folio through origination oriented measures are restricted. Expanding the banks approach
to active portfolio management may serve to enhance portfolio information, profitability
and robustness with respect to the portfolio risk/return profile.
1.2 Research Question
How can active portfolio management be used given the limitations in being a Nordic bank
with a non-granular corporate & institutional banking portfolio?
1.3 Methodology
The approach taken in this thesis is based on introduction of computationally effective
methods for evaluating portfolio concentration risk and thus determining which exposures
that are most favorable with respect to yield on capital at stake. This information may
underlay decision making in transaction origination and capital market activities targeted
to improve the structure of non-granular loan portfolios.
The study is initiated through a literature review, which is aimed to provide a theoretical
presentation of the regarded credit risk models, with focus on the analytical multi-factor
adjustment developed by Pykhin (2004) and the simulation based importance sampling
Monte Carlo methods developed by Glasserman and Li (2005). This is followed by a study
of portfolio management aspects and tools, which to a large extent are aligned with those in
Hünseler (2013) and Bouteillé and Coogan-Pushner (2013). The purpose is here to give the
reader insight in quantitative credit risk modeling and connect the considered risk models
to the framework of active portfolio management.
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In the proceeding numerical analysis, the risk models are evaluated through a Matlab
implementation, with focus on accuracy and computational efficiency. The Pykhtin multi-
factor adjustment is considered on portfolio level whereas the Monte Carlo methods are
examined for portfolio, sector and obligor specific risk measures. The analysis is performed
using the underlying multi-factor model and sample portfolio set outlined in section 4.1.1.
The approach of generated portfolio data is partly chosen for simplicity, as the portfolio
structure outlined in section 4.1.1 is convenient for adjusting single properties in sensitivity
analyses, and partly because of complications in using Danske Bank market data without
disclosing details of the company’s credit risk model. The setup chosen does however not
limit generality, which is beneficial from an academical perspective.
Furthermore, the following computational setup is used for the numerical analysis:
Processor: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2500 CPU @ 3.30GHz
Installed memory (RAM): 8.00 GB
Operating system: Microsoft Windows Enterprise 7 64-bit
Computing software: Matlab R2014a (8.3.0.532), 64-bit (win64)
1.4 Limitations
The credit risk models regarded in this study do not capture contagion risk, i.e. risk aris-
ing from direct business connections between counter-parties. This risk-type has proven to
play a significant role in various financial crises, as stated in OECD (2012), but has here
been left out in order to preserve simplicity of the considered factor risk models.
The models are further restricted to being default-mode only models, which are based
on the foundational assumption that credit losses exclusively are stemming from counter-
parties defaulting on their obligations. All exposures are additionally assumed to have
a maturity of one year and we do not account for transitions in obligor credit qualities.
These assumptions are however less restrictive from a perspective of generality, as the one
year factor risk models considered in this thesis may be incorporated in a larger, multi-
year credit model with little added complexity. Such a model could be adjusted to account
for transition risk, but details on designing such structures will not be covered in this thesis.
The credit risk model derivations presented are general with respect to the distribution
of the loss given default variables. Several distributions for modeling these variables have
been suggested in academia and the appropriate choice of distribution depends on several
factors connected to portfolio characteristics, and a detailed discussion of this subject lies
outside the scope of this thesis for reasons of simplicity. Furthermore, the set of sample
portfolios used in the numerical analysis is of limited size to make this study comprehensive.
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A complete active portfolio management framework covers several aspects such as or-
ganizational structures, accounting standards, business strategies, trading strategies and
credit risk models. Covering all aspects demands expertise within each separate field and
although some of these fields are considered briefly in section 3, the core focus of this
project lies in credit risk modeling, with focus on models which may be applied for port-
folio analyses rather than regulatory purposes.
Finally, the computational hardware has set limits to the ability of reaching high levels
of convergence for some of the considered Monte Carlo methods.
3
2 Credit Risk Modeling
2.1 An Introduction to the Multi-Factor Merton Model
The credit risk models regarded in this study are all factor risk models, a type of credit risk
models originating from the pioneering work of Merton (1974). Factor risk models have
gained popularity in the credit industry for effectively modeling asset correlations through
a limited set of risk factors. The scope is further restricted to default mode-only models,
meaning models where losses exclusively stem from obligors defaulting on their obligations.
2.1.1 The Multi-Factor Model Setup
This section aims to introduce the multi-factor model setup regarded in this study. Foun-
dational definitions and assumptions are here followed by an introduction to portfolio loss
rates. The framework presented here lays the foundation for the credit risk estimation
techniques which will later be examined and evaluated.
2.1.1.1 Framework Definition
We define the properties of each loan in a portfolio analogous to (Bouteillé and Coogan-
Pushner, 2013, p. 89).
Assumption 1
Each loan in a portfolio can be characterized by the following properties:
(i) Exposure at Default (EAD): The nominal amount of money at risk.
(ii) Probability of Default (PD): The probability that an obligor defaults on its obligations.
(iii) Loss Given Default (LGD): The relative amount of the exposure lost in case of default.
(iv) Tenor (T): The time during which the money is outstanding.
Following (Lütkebohmert, 2009, p. 5), we further assume that each obligor i = 1...M in a
portfolio correspond to one single loan and define the exposure weight of obligor i as:
wi =
EADi
M∑
j=1
EADj
. (1)
Assumption 2
An obligor defaults if its asset return Xi falls below a default threshold di (Lütkebohmert,
2009, p. 24).
We define the default indicator of obligor i as a Bernoulli distributed stochastic variable
in accordance with (Lütkebohmert, 2009, p. 6), which takes the value 1 in the event of the
obligor defaulting and zero else wise:
Di = 1{Xi < di} ∼ Bern [1, P (Xi < di)] . (2)
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Assumption 3
The logarithmic asset return Xi of obligor i in time period [0,T] is a linear function of
N independent standard normal systematic risk factors {Zk}k=1...N and an independent
standard normal idiosyncratic shock ξi (Lütkebohmert, 2009, p. 24).
This assumption may be formulated mathematically in the following way:
Xi = riYi +
√
1− r2i ξi, Yi, ξi ∼ N(0, 1), (3)
where ri denotes the factor loading and Yi the composite risk factor defined as:
Yi =
N∑
k=1
βikZk, Zk ∼ N(0, 1), (4)
in accordance to (Lütkebohmert, 2009, p 24-25). It must hold that
N∑
k=1
β2ik = 1 in order for
Yi to satisfy unit variance and the asset return correlation in-between obligors i and j is
thereby fully determined through the set of systematic risk factors:
corr(Xi, Xj) = rirj
N∑
k=1
βikβjk. (5)
It follows from (3) that asset returns are assumed standard normal distributed under the
assumptions of this model. Given normality, the property PDi = P (Xi < di) implies that
di = N−1(PDi) must hold. We may thus re-write (2) by using the probability of default:
Di = 1{Xi < N−1(PDi)} ∼ Bern
[
1, P (Xi < N−1(PDi))
]
, (6)
as is stated in (Lütkebohmert, 2009, p. 25).
We proceed with introducing a stochastic loss given default variable LGDi with expected
value E[LGDi] and variance V[LGDi], representing the loss given default of obligor i. The
variables are assumed to be bounded in the interval1 [-1,1] but their distribution is left
unspecified at this stage2.
Assumption 4
The default indicators {Di}i=1...M , the exposure at default variables {EADi}i=1...M and the
loss given default variables {LGDi}i=1...M are independent (Lütkebohmert, 2009, p. 7).
1Negative values of loss given default corresponds to short positions.
2Several approaches exist for modeling stochastic loss given default and we are therefore not restricting our
derivation to a certain distribution. In the proceeding of this thesis, it will however be assumed that a
distribution for modeling the loss given default variables has been chosen.
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2.1.1.2 Portfolio Loss Rates
In this setup, the loss rate of a portfolio may be represented as a stochastic variable in the
following way:
L =
M∑
i=1
wiLGDiDi. (7)
We may now proceed by seeking an expression for the expectation of the portfolio loss
rate conditional on the composite risk factors {Yi}i=1...M , following (Lütkebohmert, 2009,
p. 27). Given (3), the following expressions are equivalent:
Xi < N
−1(PDi) ⇐⇒ ξi < N
−1(PDi)− riYi√
1− r2i
, (8)
and the normality of ξi allows for the conditional probability of default of obligor i to be
formulated as:
PDi(Yi) = N
N−1(PDi)− riYi√
1− r2i
 . (9)
The conditional probability of default may be interpreted as the likelihood of obligor i
defaulting given a certain state of the economy3, as stated in (Lütkebohmert, 2009, p. 26).
We now obtain the conditional expectation of the portfolio loss rate by insertion of the
conditional default probabilities in (7), as the exposure weights and loss given default
variables are independent of the systematic risk factors (Lütkebohmert, 2009, p. 27):
E[L | {Yi}i=1...M ] =
M∑
i=1
wiE[LGDi]N
N−1(PDi)− riYi√
1− r2i
. (10)
We further note that asset returns are conditionally independent given a realization of the
systematic risk factors. This implies conditional independence of obligor losses, which is a
foundational property for several of the models regarded in this study.
In this thesis we refer to all obligors with loadings larger than zero on the same set of
systematic risk factors as a sector. This definition is intuitive as it is implied from (5)
that the asset returns of obligors within a sector are closer linked than those of obligors
in different sectors. In practice, a multi-factor model may be set up such that sectors and
risk factors are related to risk drivers such as geographical regions and industries.
3This follows as the obligor specific composite risk factors {Yi}i=1...M represents the impact market move-
ments has on obligor asset returns.
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2.2 Analytical Estimation Techniques
This section presents analytical estimation techniques for estimating portfolio Value at
Risk and Expected Shortfall. These techniques allow for risk measures to be estimated
without the corresponding portfolio loss distribution, in contrast to the simulation based
methods considered later in this thesis.
2.2.1 The Asymptotic Single Risk Factor Framework
The Asymptotic Single Risk Factor framework, which we will from here on refer to as
ASRF, was developed by Gordy (2003) and provides a method for approximating quantiles
of the loss rate distribution of a portfolio under a few restricting assumptions.
2.2.1.1 Framework Definition
We begin with specifying one out of the three foundational assumptions in the framework.
Assumption 5
For a portfolio of interest, it holds that:
(i) The portfolio is infinitely fine-grained.
(ii) All obligors in the portfolio are influenced by the same single systematic risk factor.
This assumption is analog to that in (Lütkebohmert, 2009, p. 32). Assumption 5(i) refers
to the negligibility of idiosyncratic risk that follows from the law of large numbers for large
enough portfolios4, meaning that the risk of a portfolio reduces to the uncertainty of the
systematic risk factors. Assumption 5(ii) implies that the factor model in (3) reduces to:
Xi = riY +
√
1− r2i ξi, Y, ξi ∼ N(0, 1), (11)
where the Y denotes the standard normal distributed single risk factor of the portfolio.
Assumption 6
For the variables Vi = LGDiDi i = 1...M , it holds that:
(i) The variables are bounded in the interval [-1,1].
(ii) The variables are mutually independent conditional on the systematic risk factor Y .
This assumption follows that in (Lütkebohmert, 2009, p. 32). Given assumptions 5(i) and
6 it holds almost surely, conditional on the systematic risk factor Y taking value y, that
the conditional expectation of a portfolio loss rate converges to the true loss rate as the
portfolio size tends to infinity:
P
(
lim
M→∞
[LM − E[LM | y]] = 0
)
= 1, (12)
4The law of large numbers is described in detail in theorem 1, section 2.3.
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where LM denotes the loss rate of a portfolio withM obligors5. This follows as idiosyncratic
risk is eliminated through diversification, making the loss rate fully driven by the system-
atic risk factors and the law of large numbers becomes applicable through assumption 6(ii).
A proof of (12) is to be found in (Hibbeln, 2010, p. 57). We proceed by making the
following assumption, in line with (Lütkebohmert, 2009, p. 35)6:
Assumption 7
There exist an open interval ω that contains the quantile of the systematic risk factor qα(Y )
and a real number m <∞ such that:
(i) for all M , E[VM | y] is continuos in Y on ω,
(ii) E[LM | y] is nonincreasing in y on ω for all M > m,
(iii) supy∈ω E[LM | y] ≤ infy≤inf ω E[LM | y] for all M > m,
(iv) infy∈ω E[LM | y] ≥ infy≥supω E[LM | y] for all M > m.
This assumption serves to ensure that a region around a quantile of the expected conditional
loss rate E[L |Y ] is related to a region of a quantile of the systematic single risk factor Y
at the same confidence level. Under assumption 5(ii) and 7 it then holds for M > m:
qα (E[LM |Y ]) = E ([LM | y = q1−α(Y )]) , (13)
according to (Lütkebohmert, 2009, p. 34). The reader is here referred to (Hibbeln, 2010,
p. 53)7 for a proof of (13).
2.2.1.2 Estimation of Loss Rate Quantiles
Following assumptions 5, 6 and 7 and relations (12) and (13), it then holds that:
qASRFα (L) = lim
M→∞
qα(LM ) = lim
M→∞
qα(E[LM |Y ]) = lim
M→∞
E ([LM | y = q1−α(Y )]) . (14)
It further follows from (10) and (14) that an analytical formula for Value at Risk under
the ASRF assumptions can be formulated as follows (Hibbeln, 2010, p. 38):
V aRASRFα (L) = qASRFα (L) =
M∑
i=1
wiE[LGDi]N
N−1(PDi)− riq1−α(Y )√
1− r2i
. (15)
5The loss rate is here indexed to simplify the formulation of assumption 7.
6Assumption 7 differs from (Gordy, 2003, p. 207, A-4) since we in this thesis have defined the loss rate to
be decreasing with Y, see equation (10).
7Gordy (2003) states a proof under the assumption that the expectation of the loss rate is monotonically
increasing with Y . We choose to refer to the proof of Hibbeln (2010) as it is based on the assumption that
the expectation is monotonically decreasing with Y .
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2.2.2 The Pykhtin Multi-Factor Adjustment
Following the granularity adjustment technique for the ASRF developed by Gordy (2003),
Pykhin (2004) presents an extension of the technique into a multi-factor framework.
This model aims to approximate Value at Risk and Expected Shortfall for a multi-factor
portfolio loss rate distribution through an appropriately chosen single-factor model and a
correction term, here referred to as a multi-factor adjustment, which accounts for effects
of diversification and finite granularity. The reasonings and results presented here follows
the original article by Pykhin (2004).
2.2.2.1 Taylor Expansion of Loss Rate Quantiles
For the loss rate L of a multi-factor model, we define a perturbed variable L = L˜ + U ,
where U denotes the perturbation U = L − L˜, and seek to estimate the α-quantile qα(L)
through a second order taylor expansion of qα(L) around qα(L˜)8 evaluated at  = 1:
qα(L) = qα(L˜) +
dqα(L)
d
∣∣∣∣
=0
+ 12
d2qα(L)
d2
∣∣∣∣
=0
, (16)
as L then reduces to L. The first and second order derivative of qα(L) have been derived
by Gourieroux et al. (2000) and can be obtained from:
dqα(L)
d
∣∣∣∣
=0
= E
[
U
∣∣∣∣ L˜ = l]∣∣∣∣
l=qα(L˜)
, (17)
d2qα(L)
d2
∣∣∣∣
=0
= − 1
pL˜(l)
d
dl
(
pL˜(l)V
[
U
∣∣∣∣ L˜ = l])∣∣∣∣
l=qα(L˜)
, (18)
where pL˜(·) denotes the probability density function of L˜.
In words, this approach is based on relating the quantile of a multi-factor loss distri-
bution to that of a single factor limiting loss distribution through a second order taylor
expansion, by letting the perturbed variable approach the multi-factor loss distribution.
The correction terms in the taylor expansion may thus be interpreted as a multi-factor
adjustment to the quantile of the single factor loss distribution.
2.2.2.2 Defining a Suitable Single-Factor Model
We now seek to define the variable L˜ in such a way that it in the best way possible captures
the behavior of the multi-factor loss rate L. In doing so, we define L˜ through a single-factor
8This reasoning is based on the results of Martin and Wilde (2002), where it is shown that (16) hold if the
confidence level α is set high enough.
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limiting loss distribution in analogy with (10):
L˜ = l(Y˜ ) =
M∑
i=1
wiE[LGDi] ˜PDi(Y˜ ), (19)
˜PDi(Y˜ ) = N
N−1(PDi)− r˜iY˜√
1− r˜2i
 , (20)
where ˜PDi(Y˜ ) denotes the probability of default of obligor i conditional on the single
systematic risk factor Y˜ defined under the assumptions of the ASRF, in accordance to (9).
Analogous to (15), the α-quantile of L˜ can be obtained as:
qα(L˜) = l
(
N−1(1− α)
)
. (21)
Furthermore, conditioning on L˜ = qα(L˜) is equivalent9 to conditioning on Y˜ = N−1(1−α),
which makes us able to re-formulate (17) and (18)10 as:
dqα(L)
d
∣∣∣∣
=0
= E
[
U
∣∣∣∣ Y˜ = y]∣∣∣∣
y=N−1(1−α)
, (22)
d2qα(L)
d2
∣∣∣∣
=0
= − 1
φ(y)
d
dy
(
φ(y)v(y)
l′(y)
)∣∣∣∣
y=N−1(1−α)
, (23)
where v(y) denotes V
[
U
∣∣∣∣ Y˜ = y] and φ(·) refers to the standard normal probability den-
sity function.
In the article by Pykhin (2004), it is stated that choosing L˜ such that it equals E
[
L | Y˜
]
for any portfolio constellation is beneficial partly for intuitive reasons, as we are to ap-
proximate quantiles of L through L˜, and partly because of the fact that such a definition
implies that (22) equals zero, as it then holds that:
E
[
U
∣∣∣∣ Y˜ ] = E [L− L˜ ∣∣∣∣ Y˜ ] = E [L ∣∣∣∣ Y˜ ]− E [L ∣∣∣∣ Y˜ ] = 0. (24)
This implies that we are now only interested in computing the second derivative in (16).
We further assume that the single risk factor Y˜ can be described as a linear function of
the systematic risk factors {Zk}k=1...N in the multi-factor model (4) such that:
Y˜ =
N∑
k=1
β˜kZk, (25)
9This holds as L˜ is monotonically decreasing in Y˜ .
10We here make use of the chain rule: d
dl
= d
dy
dy
dl
= d
dy
1
l′(y) .
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and given that Y˜ is standard normal,
N∑
k=1
β˜2k = 1 must hold. Furthermore, Pykhin (2004)
assumes that the obligor specific composite risk factor Yi can be described as a function of
the single risk factor Y˜ and a variable ηi which is standard normal distributed:
Yi = ρ˜iY˜ +
√
1− ρ˜2i ηi. (26)
The variables {ηi}i=1...M are assumed mutually dependent but independent of Y˜ and ρ˜i
denotes the correlation between the composite risk factors in the single factor (25) and the
multi-factor loss distribution (4), defined as:
ρ˜i ≡ corr(Yi, Y˜ ) =
N∑
k=1
βikβ˜k. (27)
This enables us to formulate the following relation between the asset return of obligor i
and the single risk factor:
Xi = riρ˜iY˜ + ri
√
1− ρ˜i2ηi +
√
1− r2i ξi, (28)
which, due to the mutual independence of ηi and ξi, we may simplify to:
Xi = riρ˜iY˜ +
√
1− (riρ˜i)2ξ˜i, (29)
where ξ˜ is standard normal distributed and independent of Y˜ . In analogy with (10), we
may write the expected loss rate conditional on the single risk factor as:
E
[
L
∣∣∣∣ Y˜ ] = M∑
i=1
wiE [LGDi]N
(
N−1(PDi)− riρ˜iY˜√
1− (riρ˜i)2
)
. (30)
The relation in (30), together with (19) and (20), enables us to determine the single risk
factor loadings {r˜i}i=1...M , as they must satisfy the following condition:
r˜i = riρ˜i = ri
N∑
k=1
βikβ˜k. (31)
Now remaining is to determine the parameters {β˜k}k=1...N , which constitutes the link
between the single risk factor and the risk factors in the multi-factor model (25). In the
article by Pykhin (2004), it is argued that a good choice of parameters is one that minimizes
the difference between qα(L˜) and the sought after quantile qα(L) and that an intuitive way
of achieving this is to define the parameters such that the single risk factor Y˜ becomes
11
as correlated with the composite risk factors {Yi}i=1...M as possible. We formulate this
mathematically in the following optimization problem:
maximize
{β˜k}
M∑
i=1
cicorr(Y˜ , Yi),
subject to
N∑
k=1
β˜2k = 1,
(32)
and as we previously have defined the factor correlation in (27), the solution to (32) is11:
β˜k =
M∑
i=1
ciβik
λ
, (33)
where λ denotes a positive Lagrange multiplier defined such that the constraint in (32) is
fulfilled and {ci}i=1...M is specified according to12:
ci = wiE[LGDi]N
N−1(PDi) + riN−1(α)√
1− r2i
 . (34)
2.2.2.3 Multi-Factor Adjustment for Value at Risk
Having determined all parameters for mapping a multi-factor loss rate L to a single-factor
loss rate L˜, we may now describe the taylor expansion in (16) as a single-factor model with
a multi-factor adjustment ∆qα(L) in form of the correction term. Given (16) and (23) we
may, by using the relation φ′(y) = −yφ(y), express the multi-factor adjustment as:
∆qα(L) = qα(L)− qα(L˜) = − 12l′(y)
[
v′(y)− v(y)
(
l′′(y)
l′(y) + y
)]∣∣∣∣
y=N−1(1−α)
. (35)
The derivatives l′(y) and l′′(y) can easily be obtained from (19):
l′(y) =
M∑
i=1
wiE[LGDi] ˜PD′i(y), (36)
l′′(y) =
M∑
i=1
wiE[LGDi] ˜PD′′i (y), (37)
11We refer to Pykhin (2004) for the methodology used to obtain this result.
12This specification has been selected in Pykhin (2004) by empirically testing a number of specifications
based on intuitive reasonings and assumptions. The reader is referred to the article for further details.
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and the differentiated conditional probabilities analogously follow from (20):
˜PD′i(y) = −
r˜i√
1− r˜2i
φ
N−1(PDi)− r˜iy√
1− r˜2i
 , (38)
˜PD′′i (y) = −
r˜2i
1− r˜2i
N−1(PDi)− r˜iy√
1− r˜2i
φ
N−1(PDi)− r˜iy√
1− r˜2i
 , (39)
where N2 denotes the bivariate standard normal distribution. As of now, all parameters
in (35) are known except for the conditional variance v(y) and its derivative v′(y). We
note that it must hold that v(y) = V(U | Y˜ = y) = V(L | Y˜ = y), since L˜ is deterministic
conditional on Y˜ , and we will thus seek to determine the conditional variance of L. By
using (26) and (27), we may rewrite the asset return for obligor i stated in (28) as:
Xi = r˜iY˜ +
N∑
k=1
(riβik − r˜iβ˜k)Zk +
√
1− r2i ξi, (40)
which shows that the asset returns are correlated through the systematic risk factors in
the second term on the right hand side of (40). Given (40) and the previously stated
constraints
N∑
k=1
β2ik = 1 and
N∑
k=1
β˜2k = 1, we may formulate the asset correlation for obligors
i and j conditional on Y˜ :
ρY˜ij =

rirj
N∑
k=1
βikβjk − r˜ir˜j√
1− r˜2i
√
1− r˜2j
, i 6= j,
1 , i = j.
(41)
In his article, Pykhin (2004) suggests that v(y) can be divided in systematic and idiosyn-
cratic components as the asset returns are independent conditional on the composite risk
factors {Zk}k=1...N as follows:
v(y) = V
[
L | Y˜ = y
]
=
= V
[
E [L | {Zk}k=1...N ] | Y˜ = y
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Systematic
+ E
[
V [L | {Zk}k=1...N ] | Y˜ = y
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Idiosyncratic
, (42)
where the systematic term accounts for the difference in variance in between the limiting
loss distribution in a multi-factor setting (10) and the previously defined single-factor set-
ting (19), and the idiosyncratic term adjusts for the granularity of the portfolio.
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Pykhin (2004) further states that we may compute the systematic component of the con-
ditional variance as:
vsystematic(y) =
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
wiwjE[LGDi]E[LGDj ][
N2
(
N−1
[
˜PDi(y)
]
, N−1
[
˜PDj(y)
]
, ρY˜ij
)
,− ˜PDi(y) ˜PDj(y)
]
,
(43)
and its derivative can be obtained from differentiation:
v′systematic(y) = 2
M∑
i=1
M∑
i=1
wiwjE[LGDi]E[LGDj ] ˜PD
′
i(y)N
N−1
[
˜PDj(y)
]
− ρY˜ijN−1
[
˜PDi(y)
]
√
1− (ρY˜ij)2
 . (44)
The corresponding relation for the idiosyncratic component is:
vidiosyncratic(y) =
M∑
i=1
w2i(
E[LGDi]2
[
˜PDi(y)−N2
(
N−1
[
˜PDi(y)
]
, N−1
[
˜PDi(y)
]
, ρY˜ii
)]
+ V[LGDi]2 ˜PDi(y)
)
,
(45)
and its derivative can analogously be obtained as:
v′idiosyncratic(y) =
M∑
i=1
w2i ˜PD
′
i(y)E[LGDi]2
1− 2N
N−1[ ˜PDi(y)]− ρY˜iiN−1[ ˜PDi(y)]√
1− (ρY˜ii )2
+ V[LGDi]2
 . (46)
All terms in (35) have now been obtained and we are thus able to estimate a quantile qα(L)
through the multi-factor adjustment as follows:
qα(L) = qα(L˜) + ∆qα(L). (47)
As the multi-factor adjustment is a linear function of the conditional variance it is possible
to divide it into a systematic and an idiosyncratic component analogous to the conditional
variance, which we may write as: ∆qα(L) = ∆qsystematicα (L) + ∆qidiosyncraticα (L). The
quadratic weights (45) and (46) ensures that the idiosyncratic contribution goes to zero
asymptotically as the granularity of a portfolio tends to infinity.
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2.2.2.4 Multi-Factor Adjustment for Expected Shortfall
As we now are able to compute loss rate quantiles, we proceed by seeking a way to estimate
Expected Shortfall through the multi-factor adjustment. In the following definition of
Expected Shortfall:
ESα(L) =
1
1− α
∫ 1
α
qu(L) du, (48)
we substitute the quantile with the multi-factor adjustment qα(L) = qα(L˜) + ∆qα(L) and
may thus re-formulate the expression as:
ESα(L) = ESα(L˜) +
1
1− α
∫ 1
α
∆qu(L) du, (49)
where ESα(L˜) denotes the Expected Shortfall of our single-factor loss rate distribution.
Following definition (103) in Appendix A.5, we may compute ESα(L˜) as:
ESα(L˜) = E
[
l(Y˜ )
∣∣∣∣ Y˜ ≤ N−1(1− α)] = 11− α
∫ N−1(1−α)
−∞
l(y)φ(y) dy, (50)
which, by insertion of l(y) from (19) and use of the relation
∫ z
−∞ φ(u)N(
x−r˜y√
1−r˜2 )du =
N2(x, z, r˜), can be re-formulated as:
ESα(L˜) =
1
1− α
M∑
i=1
wiE[LGDi]N2
[
N−1(PDi), N−1(1− α), r˜i
]
. (51)
In order to evaluate the integral term in (49), we make use of relations (16) and (23)
to formulate an expression for ∆qα(L), which by insertion gives the following integral
expression:
∆ESα(L) = − 12(1− α)
∫ 1
α
1
φ(y)
d
dy
(
φ(y)v(y)
l′(y)
)∣∣∣∣
y=N−1(1−u)
du. (52)
According to (Pykhin, 2004, p. 88), this integral can be solved by exchanging variable u for
t = N−1(1−u) in order to arrive at a complete expression for the multi-factor adjustment:
∆ESα(L) = − 12(1− α)φ
[
N−1(1− α)
] v [N−1(1− α)]
l′ [N−1(1− α)] . (53)
In analogy with the Value at Risk multi-factor adjustment, (53) can be divided into sys-
tematic and idiosyncratic parts: ∆ESα(L) = ∆ESsystematicα (L) + ∆ESidiosyncraticα (L).
Remark 1 These results build on the assumption that the effective factor loadings {r˜i}i=1...M
are independent of the confidence level α, which is contradicted by the fact that the factor
loadings are assumed to be a function of the quantile dependent parameters {β˜k}k=1...N , as
can be seen in (32) - (34). A solution to this problem would be to develop a new parameter
estimation technique in order to make the parameters quantile independent (Pykhin, 2004,
p. 88) but we will, however, not consider such a technique in this thesis.
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2.2.2.5 Enhancement of Computational Efficiency
This model’s main determinant of computational efficiency is the number of obligors in a
portfolio, following the double sums in (43) and (44), which are giving rise to a quadratic
relationship between computational time and number of obligors.
A solution to this bottle-neck is suggested in (Hibbeln, 2010, p. 196), where it is stated
that the model can be applied on sector level, conditional on a setup where the sectors are
divided into sub-sectors after probability of default and all positions in each sub-sector are
aggregated. The computational effort then reduces according to:
Computational Effort ∝ (Number of Sectors ·Number of Sub-Sectors)2, (54)
where the number of sub-sectors becomes a tradeoff between accuracy and computational
efficiency. The idiosyncratic part of the granularity adjustment does, however, remain on
obligor level in order to account for diversification effects across names, but this does not
constitute a significant computational burden in comparison to computing (43) and (44).
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2.3 Simulation Based Estimation Techniques
This section discusses the simulation based Monte Carlo methods, which is a family of
estimation techniques which use independent draws from a set of random variables to
empirically evaluate a function or a problem. The basic Crude Monte Carlo method is
initially applied for estimating properties of portfolio loss rate distributions and we later
advance to discussions about importance sampling based variance reduction techniques.
2.3.1 The Crude Monte Carlo Method
In this section we define the Crude Monte Carlo estimator and examine how it can be
applied in order to estimate loss rate probabilities.
2.3.1.1 The Crude Monte Carlo Estimator
We here give an introduction to the Crude Monte Carlo estimator in line with (Pastel,
2012, p. 15-27).
Theorem 1 (Strong law of large numbers)
Consider a set {fi}i=1...n of independent identically distributed variables, which are dis-
tributed as f with finite expected value E[f ] < ∞. For such a set, it holds almost surely
that the empirical average f¯n of the set converges to the expected value (Pastel, 2012, p. 16).
We describe this mathematically as:
lim
n→∞ f¯n = limn→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
fi = E [f ] . (55)
The Crude Monte Carlo estimator is a direct application of theorem 1, as it uses a large
number of independent realizations of a function or variable to evaluate its expected value.
The estimator is unbiased following the strong law of large numbers and in order to evaluate
its variance and rate of convergence, we state the central limit theorem.
Theorem 2 (Central limit theorem)
Consider a set {fi}i=1...n of independent identically distributed variables which are dis-
tributed as f with expected value E[f ] and finite variance V[f ] < ∞. For such a set, it
holds that the variable sequence
√
n
(
f¯n − E[f ]
)
is asymptotically normal distributed with
mean zero and variance V[f ] (Pastel, 2012, p. 16). This implies the following relation:
n∑
i=1
fi − nE[f ]√
V[f ]
√
n
d−→ N(0, 1) as n −→∞. (56)
According to (Atzberger, p. 2), the central limit theorem implies that the estimation error
of the Crude Monte Carlo estimator may be formulated as:
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ef¯ =
∣∣∣f¯ − E[f ]∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
fi − E[f ]
∣∣∣∣∣ =
=
√
V[f ]√
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
fi − nE[f ]√
V[x]
√
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≈
√
V[f ]√
n
|N(0, 1)| .
(57)
Following the strong law of large numbers and the central limit theorem, it holds that the
Crude Monte Carlo estimator has expected value E[f ] and variance is V[f ]/n . This implies
that the Crude Monte Carlo estimator is an unbiased and consistent estimator with a rate
of convergence of of O(
√
n), as stated in (Pastel, 2012, p. 16).
2.3.1.2 Estimation of Portfolio Tail Loss Probabilities
We here seek to estimate portfolio tail probabilities with the Crude Monte Carlo method
presented in the previous section. This approach uses a number of scenarios S, for each of
which a portfolio loss rate is computed and an indicator function 1{L > x} is evaluated.
The tail probabilities are estimated as the expected values of the indicator function at
different thresholds x, analogous to (Pastel, 2012, p. 22). We describe this mathematically:
P (L > x) = E [1{L > x}] , (58)
and give a detailed pseduocode description in algorithm 1 of how the Crude Monte Carlo
method can be applied for evaluation of the estimator in (58).
Algorithm 1 Crude Monte Carlo
1: for each scenario s = 1 to S do
2: Draw systematic risk factors Z ∼ N(0, I)
3: Compute the composite risk factors Y
4: Draw loss given default variables LGD
5: Compute the conditional default probabilities PD(Y )
6: Draw default indicators DPD(Y )
7: Compute scenario loss rate Ls and estimator 1{Ls > x}
8: end for
9: Estimate P (L > x) ≈ 1S
S∑
s=1
1{Ls > x}
Given the estimated tail probabilities, the loss distribution can be obtained from:
FL(x) = P (L ≤ x) = 1− P (L > x). (59)
18
It is stated in (Pastel, 2012, p. 22) that the empirical loss distribution converges almost
surely to the true loss distribution as the number of scenarios tends to infinity, following
from the law of large numbers. Risk measures Value at Risk and Expected Shortfall can be
estimated from the empirical loss distribution in accordance to definitions (99) and (103)
in Appendix A: Risk Measures.
2.3.2 The Importance Sampling Monte Carlo Method
Several methods exist for enhancing performance and improving accuracy by reducing
the variance of Monte Carlo estimators. One such technique is the importance sampling
Monte Carlo method, which uses a change of probability measure to increase precision in a
region of interest. We here give an introduction to the importance sampling Monte Carlo
estimator and examine how the technique can be applied to estimate loss rate probabilities.
2.3.2.1 The Importance Sampling Monte Carlo Estimator
We consider a function f(u) of random variable u which has probability density p(u),
and introduce an (appropriately chosen) alternative density q(u). As stated in (Pastel,
2012, p. 29), the importance sampling technique takes advantage of the definition of the
expected value on integral form in order to make sampling from the alternative density
function possible. We describe this mathematically as:
E [f(u)] = Eq
[
f(u)p(u)
q(u)
]
=
∫
Ω
f(u)p(u)
q(u)q(u) du, (60)
where the quote p(u)/q(u) denotes the likelihood ratio. As can be seen in (60), it is possible
to achieve an unbiased estimator for E[f(u)] by evaluating the integral expression under
the alternative measure q(u) and compensate for the shift of sampling distribution through
the likelihood ratio. It follows from the relation between expectation and variance13 and
the equality between the expectations in (60) that variance reduction is obtained from
importance sampling if the following relation holds:
Eq
[(
f(u)p(u)
q(u)
)2]
= E
[
f(u)2 p(u)
q(u)
]
< E
[
f(u)2
]
, (61)
as stated in (Glasserman, 2003, p. 256). The efficiency of the method is thus dependent on
the choice of q(u), but the optimal choice does however depend on the problem at hand.
We address this issue further when applying importance sampling to the simulation of
portfolio tail loss probabilities in sections 2.3.2.2 - 2.3.2.3.
13 V[f(x)] = E[f(u)2]− E[f(u)]2.
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2.3.2.2 Conditional Importance Sampling
The conditional importance sampling method of exponential twisting developed by Glasser-
man and Li (2005) applies a shift in default probabilities {Qi}i=1...M ≥ {PDi}i=1...M to
increase the number of observations of large loss rates when estimating tail probabilities.
We have previously introduced the concept of importance sampling in section 2.3.1 and
will now seek a suitable way to shift the default probabilities in order to reduce variance
in estimating loss rate probabilities.
In their article, Glasserman and Li (2005) recognize that a substitution of default proba-
bilities gives rise to a convenient importance sampling estimator (60) under the condition
that the obligors are independent. In this case, we obtain the likelihood ratio Λ from the
following relation:
Λ =
M∏
i=1
(
PDi
Qi
)Di (1− PDi
1−Qi
)1−Di
, (62)
and the importance sampling estimator for the tail probabilities of a loss rate distribution
under the new set of default probabilities may be formulated as:
P (L > x) = EQ [1{L > x}Λ] . (63)
For the choice of default probabilities, Glasserman and Li (2005) further suggest that a
new set of probabilities can be obtained from the following twist function:
Qi(θ) =
PDi e
wiLGDiθ
1 + PDi (ewiLGDiθ − 1) , θ ≥ 0,
(64)
where the parameter θ is to be chosen such that the estimator variance is minimized. Under
this set of default probabilities, the likelihood ratio may be written as:
Λ(θ) =
M∏
i=1
(
PDi
Qi(θ)
)Di ( 1− PDi
1−Qi(θ)
)1−Di
= exp(−θL+ κ(θ)), (65)
where κ(θ) denotes the cumulant generating function of the loss rate L, defined as:
κ(θ) = log
(
E
[
eθL
])
=
M∑
i=1
log(1 + PDi(ewiLGDiθ − 1), (66)
in accordance to (Glasserman and Li, 2005, p. 1645). It holds from (60) and (61) that the
importance sampling estimator is unbiased and that all variance reduction is determined
by the estimator’s second moment, which is to be obtained from the moment generating
function as:
Mt(x, θ) = EQ
[
(1{L > x}Λ(θ))t
]∣∣∣∣
t=2
= EQ
[
1{L > x}e−tθL+tκ(θ)
]∣∣∣∣
t=2
. (67)
20
The problem at hand is thus to determine θ such that (67) is minimized. Glasserman and
Li (2005) suggest to minimize an upper bound rather than the expectation in (67) in order
to avoid a fairly cumbersome minimization problem. Given the following upper bound:
EQ
[
1{L > x}e−2θL+2κ(θ)
]
≤ e−2θx+2κ(θ), (68)
our optimization problem reduces to:
maximize
{θ}
θx− κ(θ),
subject to θ ≥ 0.
(69)
As it holds that θx − κ(θ) passes through the origin and is strictly convex, according to
(Glasserman and Li, 2005, p. 1645), the solution to (69) can be obtained as:
θx =

unique solution to κ′(θ) = x, x > κ′(0),
0 , x ≤ κ′(0),
(70)
where the solution to κ′(θ) = x for x > κ′(θ) easily can be obtained using numerical
methods. Glasserman and Li (2005) state that the following relation holds:
EQ[L] = κ′(θ). (71)
It follows from (64) that EQ[L] = E[L] for θ = 0 and given (71) it holds that E[L] = κ′(0).
Following the analysis in (Glasserman and Li, 2005, p. 1645), we may interpret the effect
of exponential twisting in the following way:
if E[L] < x −→ set E[L] = x,
if E[L] ≥ x −→ do nothing. (72)
The method thus ensures that the expected loss rate is greater than or equal to the thresh-
old x, which is intuitively appealing when estimating P (L > x). It further holds, in
analogy to (60), that (63) is an unbiased estimator and we refer to (Glasserman and Li,
2005, p. 1645-1646) for a proof of asymptotical optimality.
The assumption of independent obligors, on which (62) is based, rarely holds, but it follows
from (3) and (4) that obligors are conditionally independent given a realization of the sys-
tematic risk factors {Zk}k=1...N . It is thus possible to twist conditional default probabilities
according to the pseudo code procedure described in algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 Importance Sampling Monte Carlo - Exponential Twisting
1: for each scenario s = 1 to S do
2: Draw systematic risk factors Z ∼ N(0, I)
3: Compute composite risk factors Y
4: Draw loss given default variables LGD
5: Compute conditional default probabilities PD(Y )
6: Compute twist parameter θx
7: Compute twisted conditional default probabilities Q(θx)
8: Draw default indicators DQ(θx)
9: Compute scenario likelihood ratio Λs = Λ(θx)
10: Compute scenario loss rate Ls and estimator 1{Ls > x}Λs
11: end for
12: Estimate P (L > x) ≈ 1S
S∑
s=1
1{Ls > x}Λs
Remark 2 As this method serves to set the expected loss rate larger than or equal to the
threshold of interest, it is suggested by Glasserman and Li (2005) that the same value for
θ may be used for a variety of thresholds x. This enhances the computational efficiency
of the model, as solving the (70) calls for external numerical methods and is the most
computationally demanding part of each iteration in algorithm 2.
2.3.2.3 Two-Step Importance Sampling
It is stated in (Glasserman and Li, 2005, p. 1647) that the magnitude of portfolio loss rates
becomes increasingly dependent on the systematic risk factors as the obligor correlation in-
creases. In order to find an importance sampling method that performs well independently
of the degree of obligor correlation, we here seek to complement the method of exponential
twisting with importance sampling on the systematic risk factors.
Analogous to (Glasserman and Li, 2005, p. 1647-1648), we decompose the variance of
the exponential twisting estimator (63) in the following way:
VQ [1{L > x}Λ] =
EQ
[
VQ
[
1{L > x}Λ
∣∣∣∣ {Zk}k=1...N]]+ VQ [EQ [1{L > x}Λ ∣∣∣∣ {Zk}k=1...N]] . (73)
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The first term in decomposition (73) is small due to the effect of the exponential twisting
and we thus focus on minimizing the second term in order to obtain further variance
reduction. Given a realization of the systematic risk factors, the estimator is unbiased and
it holds that:
EQ
[
1{L > x}Λ
∣∣∣∣ {Zk}k=1...N] = P (L > x | {Zk}k=1...N ) . (74)
This implies that an optimal choice of sampling distribution for the systematic risk factors
is one that minimizes the variance of the integral estimator (60) for P (L > x | {Zk}k=1...N ).
It is stated in (Glasserman and Li, 2005, p. 1648) that the optimal conditional sampling
distribution for the problem at hand is:
ϕ(z) = P (L > x | z)e
−zT z/2
P (L > x) . (75)
This distribution is however of limited use considering the requirement for the tail proba-
bilities in the denominator, but may serve as a starting point in the search of one that is
useful. Glasserman and Li (2005) suggest that the systematic risk factors may be sampled
from a normal distribution with the same mode as (75), which is found from maximization
of the numerator. We set the mean vector µ of this normal distribution to:
µ = arg max
{z}
P (L > x | {Zk}k=1...N = z)e−zT z/2. (76)
Finding a solution to this maximization problem is however cumbersome and it is therefore
suggested in (Glasserman and Li, 2005, p. 1648) to introduce the following upper bound
for the conditional loss probability:
P (L > x | {Zk}k=1...N = z) ≤ eFx(z), (77)
where Fx denotes the natural logarithm of the likelihood ratio Λ(θx(z), z) at L = x:
Fx(z) = ln(Λ(θx(z), z)) = −θ(z)x+ κ(θx(z), z). (78)
If the upper bound in (77) is treated as an approximation of the conditional loss probability,
the expression in (76) becomes eFx(z)−zT z/2 and the maximization problem reduces to one
of maximizing the exponent. We may thus formulate a convenient approximation of µ
which only depends on known quantities as:
µ∗ = arg max
{z}
{
Fx(z)− zT z/2
}
, (79)
according to (Glasserman and Li, 2005, p. 1648). In further accordance with the original ar-
ticle, we state the likelihood ratio linking the probability density of the normal distribution
N(µ, I) to that of a standard normal distribution N(0, I) as:
Ψ(µ,Z) = e−µTZ+µTµ/2. (80)
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We refer to (Glasserman and Li, 2005, p. 1649) for a proof of asymptotical optimality and
formulate the two-step importance sampling procedure in pseudo code:
Algorithm 3 Importance Sampling Monte Carlo - Two-Step Importance Sampling
1: Estimate the risk factor mean µ∗
2: for each scenario s = 1 to S do
3: Draw systematic risk factors Z ∼ N(µ∗, I)
4: Compute composite risk factors Y
5: Draw loss given default variables LGD
6: Compute conditional default probabilities PD(Y )
7: Compute twist parameter θx
8: Compute twisted conditional default probabilities Q(θx)
9: Draw default indicators DQ(θx)
10: Compute scenario likelihood ratio ΛsΨs = Λ(θx)Ψ(µ∗, Z)
11: Compute scenario loss rate Ls and estimator 1{Ls > x}ΛsΨs
12: end for
13: Estimate P (L > x) ≈ 1S
S∑
s=1
1{Ls > x}ΛsΨs
Remark 3 The method of shifting the risk factor expected values can be of use without the
exponential twisting technique in order to avoid the procedure of finding θx. This results in
a procedure where each iteration is computationally faster than the procedure described in
algorithm 3 but lacks the feature explained in (72).
2.3.3 Risk Decomposition using Monte Carlo Methods
We here consider methods from Burton et al. (2005) for decomposing risk contributions
into effects of expected loss, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk as well as for computing
marginal contributions to loss rates of a certain magnitude of interest.
2.3.3.1 Estimation of Systematic and Idiosyncratic Risk
In their working paper (Burton et al., 2005, p. 11-13) suggest that the loss rate of a portfolio
can be divided into components corresponding to effects of expected loss, systematic risk
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and idiosyncratic risk in the following way:
L =
M∑
i=1
E[Li]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Loss
+
M∑
i=1
(E[Li |Yi]− E[Li])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Systematic Loss
+
M∑
i=1
(Li − E[Li |Yi])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Idiosyncratic Loss
, (81)
where the three components may be computed as:
M∑
i=1
E[Li] =
M∑
i=1
wiE[LGDi]PDi, (82)
M∑
i=1
(E[Li |Yi]− E[Li]) =
M∑
i=1
wiE[LGDi] (PDi(Yi)− PDi) , (83)
M∑
i=1
(Li − E[Li |Yi]) =
M∑
i=1
(Li − wiE[LGDi]PDi(Yi)) . (84)
The first term on the right hand side of (81) is deterministic and can be computed with-
out simulation, in accordance to (105) in Appendix A: Risk Measures. The second term
corresponds to risk arising from market movements whereas the last represents name con-
centration risk and approaches zero as portfolio granularity goes to infinity. Furthermore,
Burton et al. (2005) states that leaving out the idiosyncratic term results in a loss distri-
bution corresponding to a portfolio fully diversified with respect to entity specific risk.
2.3.3.2 Marginal, Component and Incremental Value at Risk
We here follow (Burton et al., 2005, p.16-19) in order to present a methodology for com-
puting marginal risk contributions on obligor level. The results presented in the original
article are formulated on sector level and can be obtained from the results presented here
by summation over the obligors in each sector.
Denoting the set of systematic and idiosyncratic risk factors that governs the portfolio
loss H = {Zk, ξi}k=1...N,i=1...M and noting that the portfolio loss is fully deterministic
given a realization of H, here referred to as h, allows us to express the set of risk factor
realizations that renders a loss equal to the αth quantile of the loss rate distribution as:
H0α = {h | `(h) = qα(L)}, (85)
where `(h) denotes the portfolio loss conditional on a realization h. Following (Gourieroux
et al., 2000, p. 242) it can be shown14 that the marginal contribution of obligor i to portfolio
loss rate quantile qα(L) can be written as:
dqα(L)
dwi
= E
[
LGDiDi |H ∈ H0α
]
. (86)
14According to (Burton et al., 2005, p. 17).
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When using Monte Carlo methods for estimating (86), the condition of the portfolio loss
rate being precisely equal to the quantile qα(L) is likely to result in a large amount of
useless scenarios and we therefore expand (85) to include losses close to the quantile of
interest:
Hα = {h | |`(h)− qα(L)| < }, (87)
where the choice of  becomes a tradeoff between accuracy and computational efficiency.
In order to incorporate (87), we re-formulate (86) to get an approximative formula for
marginal loss rate quantiles as:
dqα(L)
dwi
≈ E [LGDiDi |H ∈ Hα] , (88)
which converges to the true formula as → 0. It follows from (88) that we are now able to
compute marginal Value at Risk according to the definition (100) in Appendix A.2:
MV aR iα(L) =
∂V aR portfolioα (L)
∂wi
. (89)
By multiplying marginal Value at Risk by the exposure weight of an obligor, we obtain the
component Value at Risk, which is exactly additive with respect to portfolio Value at Risk
and accounts for the Value at Risk contribution of an obligor to that of the full portfolio.
In accordance with the definition in Appendix A.3, we describe this mathematically as:
CV aR iα(L) = wi
∂V aR portfolioα (L)
∂wi
. (90)
Additional to being an exactly additive measure of diversified Value at Risk, component
Value at Risk may serve as an approximation for incremental Value at Risk, which denotes
the change in portfolio Value at Risk stemming from adding or removing a position15:
IV aR± iα (L) =
∣∣∣V aR portfolio± iα (L)− V aR portfolioα (L) ∣∣∣ ≈ wi∂V aRportfolioα (L)∂wi . (91)
Computing incremental Value at Risk for a large set of obligors using Monte Carlo methods
demands for a new simulation to be carried out for each position of interest, which can be
very computationally expensive. The approximation of component Value at Risk may thus
serve as an indicator of the positions carrying the largest incremental Value at Risk and
help avoiding extensive Monte Carlo simulations for less risky positions. A negative aspect
is however that the accuracy of this approximation decreases as exposure weights increase,
which is a consequence of the approximation being based on a first order derivative.
15Incremental Value at Risk from a adding and removing a position is (most often) not equal. Removing a
position can however be seen as adding a negative position, which is why we included both cases in the
same definition.
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Furthermore, Glasserman (2005) suggest that (88) can be evaluated with a two-step impor-
tance sampling estimator in which θx is set to the unique solution to κ′(θ) = x regardless
of the value of κ′(0), in contrast to (70). Setting x = V aRα then results in an unbiased
estimator where E[L |Z] = V aRα in every scenario, in contrast to (72). This implies an
increase of scenarios in the region of Value at Risk and a more precise estimation of (88)
than the Crude Monte Carlo estimator achieves.
Remark 4 A risk-type decomposition according to (85) is not possible using the importance
sampling estimator suggested by Glasserman (2005), following the property of E[L |Z] =
V aRα, which implies that the idiosyncratic loss estimator in (81) asymptotically approaches
zero (the law of large numbers) and all loss contributions become expected and systematic.
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3 Credit Portfolio Management
3.1 Managing and Rebalancing Credit Portfolios
This section considers methods for building and rebalancing credit portfolios, following the
previously considered risk estimation techniques. We begin by discussing how the work of
portfolio managers and originators may be structured for building robust and cost effective
portfolios and proceed by presenting methods for limiting and mitigating credit exposures.
3.1.1 Active Credit Portfolio Management
Active credit portfolio management is here approched as a framework of methods and tools
for building sound credit portfolios and resolving matters of unwanted credit exposures.
3.1.1.1 Roles and Responsibilities of the CPM Unit
Credit portfolios have traditionally been constructed solely by the works of origination
units, following that transactions were evaluated in isolation, similar to the previous "pick-
ing the winners" approach of the stock market. As financial theory developed along with
quantitative methods for risk assessment, a deeper understanding for the underlying pro-
cesses forming the profit and loss distribution of a portfolio has been achieved, motivating
a holistic approach to credit portfolio management. This has caused for the roles of credit
portfolio managers to evolve from strictly being a monitoring and reporting function to-
wards actively optimizing and rebalancing the credit portfolios of financial institutions.
Although responsibilities of CPM units vary across organizations, some attempts of clas-
sification have been made in academia. In (Hünseler, 2013, p. 66), roles and mandates of
CPM units are divided into four categories, ranging from a passive advisory role as risk
controller to an active management role as value creator, where each category inherits the
activities of the previous. A tabular form of this categorization is displayed in table 1.
It is argued in Hünseler (2013) that the organizational placement of a CPM unit often
is connected to its functionality, where units focusing on value creation tend to be placed
within business lines whereas units with a risk protecting approach most often are placed
in connection to risk or finance departments. A placement within business lines may serve
to increase specialization and bring portfolio managers closer to the assets of the business
lines, whereas a placement within risk or finance departments may give a holistic perspec-
tive of the portfolio under management.
No general best practices for engaging in credit portfolio management exist and finan-
cial institutions must therefore seek to tailor their structure with respect to the firms
strategies, competences and targets. Efforts have been made by IACPM (2005) to outline
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sound practices for engaging in credit portfolio management, which may serve as a point
of reference. Detailed descriptions of organizational aspects are however not in the scope
of this thesis, as focus here lies in quantitative assessment and mitigation of credit risk.
Table 1: Activities of the CPM unit (Hünseler, 2013, p. 66)
Category Activity Description
Risk Controller Monitoring & Reporting · Intelligence on key risk and capital measures.
· Monitoring credit risk strategies.
· Portfolio risk adjusted performance measurement.
· Limit reporting, loan pricing and stress tests.
Risk Protector Risk Limiting · Reduce absolute portfolio concentration.
· Limit credit Value at Risk.
· Definition of EL/LLP trigger levels and management.
· Optimization of growth allocation by minimizing cost of risk.
Risk Optimizer Portfolio Optimization · Defining target portfolio, including structural limits given
risk appetite and capital allocation.
· Optimization of growth allocation by maximizing risk
adjusted return.
· Stress test derived feasibility check for target portfolio.
· Stress test based contingency plans.
Value Creator Portfolio Reallocation · Implementing portfolio risk profile changing measures.
· Target economic/regulatory capital improvements.
· Profit and loss responsibility.
3.1.1.2 Portfolio Management Objectives and Tools
We display two portfolio loss distributions in figure 1 following (Bouteillé and Coogan-
Pushner, 2013, p. 262). The darker bars represent a sound distribution, which has its
probability mass centered at low loss levels, with low probabilities of losses large enough
to endanger the future of the corporation. The loss distribution represented by the darker
bars is cost effective with respect to economic capital and may serve as a target distribution
for the holder of the portfolio represented by the lighter bars.
The distribution represented by the lighter bars displays significant probabilities of large
losses and is ineffective from an economic capital perspective, given that it takes large funds
to cover these dangerous potential outcomes. This distributional structure may stem from
concentrations in correlated segments or large exposures towards single counter-parties.
Alignment of the lighter distribution with the darker target distribution may reduce costs
by deploying economic capital or generate new business given the same amount of held
capital. In both scenarios, the firms return on risk adjusted capital is enhanced and its
lending activities becomes more efficient (Bouteillé and Coogan-Pushner, 2013, p. 262).
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Figure 1: Example of portfolio loss distributions Bouteillé and Coogan-Pushner (2013)
In the survey Principles and Practices in Credit Portfolio Management conducted by the
International Association of Credit Portfolio Managers, IACPM (2013), representatives
from 66 financial institutions, based in 16 countries, answered to questions regarding the
workings of their CPM units. A vast majority of the survey respondents (79%) stated rev-
enue generation as one of their overall top priorities over the next 12 - 24 months, whereas
the second most quoted priority (40%) was meeting capital targets. According to IACPM
(2013), the relative importance of revenue generation has increased in the stable economic
environment following the last financial crises, whereas firms were more concerned about
meeting regulatory standards under conditions of financial stress.
On questions regarding specific key objectives, responses reflect a pro-active and cost-
effective approach to portfolio management where diversification, portfolio information
and support for origination processes constitute the highest priorities. The key objectives
quoted in the survey are displayed in table 2, along with corresponding quote frequencies.
In a broad sense, the key objectives give an indication of the branch wide opinion of
what to manage, whereas credit portfolio models, such as those previously regarded in this
study, aims to point out where to target the efforts. In what follows, we will consider tools
and methodologies for answering the question of how to manage a credit portfolio. The
measures regarded in the proceeding sections were subject for evaluation in IACPM (2013),
where the survey respondents rated management tools after perceived importance. Before
engaging in discussions about risk mitigation methods, we display these results in figure 2.
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Table 2: Key objectives of CPM unit, IACPM (2013)
Objective Quote Frequency
Improve Portfolio Structure, Reduce Concentrations 89%
Provide Portfolio Information 86%
Help Guide Origination 74%
Optimize Risk and Return (Qualitative or Quantitative) 67%
Manage Maximum Risk Appetite Target 63%
Manage Regulatory Changes 56%
Manage Return on Equity, RAROC or Similar Target 49%
Manage P & L Volatility, Absolute P & L or Similar Target 44%
Scenario Analysis & Stress Testing 44%
Liquidity / Funding Risk Assessment 28%
Enterprise Risk Management 28%
Figure 2: Relative importance of CPM tools, IACPM (2013)
3.1.1.3 Loan Pricing Methods
Adequately pricing transactions is crucial for the success of firms devoted to loan orig-
ination. An example of inconsistent pricing is given in (Hünseler, 2013, p. 43), where
flat loan margins are considered, for which each counter-party are offered the same loan
spread independently of their characteristics. This strategy implies beneficial offers to low
credit quality borrowers, who would have to pay higher spreads in the market, whereas the
opposite holds for high quality borrowers. This example points out that the lending insti-
tutes end up holding non-optimal credit portfolios by neglecting counter-party specific risk.
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Through the use of risk-adjusted pricing, counter-parties are offered spreads based on how
favorable a potential transaction is for the lender with respect to expected losses, costs
of equity, funding and administration, required economic capital as well a commercial ad-
justment, which is a weight reflecting how aligned the transaction is with the firms overall
strategy. This system aims to provide consistency in transaction pricing and encourage
originators to target loan margins which are profitable net of costs (Hünseler, 2013, p. 84).
Transfer pricing may be applied in organizations where the CPM unit has profit and
loss responsibility. In this setting, transactions are transferred to the CPM unit once origi-
nated and the originating unit is compensated according to a price at which the CPM unit
is indifferent of holding the exposure on its balance sheet or transferring it to the market
through sales or hedging (Hünseler, 2013, p. 85). Transactions originated above/below
transfer price contributes positively/negatively to the balance sheet of the origination unit,
whereas an increase/decline in value through out the holding period belongs to the balance
sheet of the CPM unit. Even though transfer pricing may serve to enhance transparency
and consistency in performance measurements across units, it is complex and must be
implemented with care in order to avoid conflicts and effects of internal arbitrage.
3.1.1.4 Information and Transparency
Client relationships tend to give financial institutions routine-access to non-public financial
statements of their counter-parties, as part of the credit evaluation process. Such informa-
tion may serve to underlay negotiations of client terms and conditions as well as to monitor
exposures and as long as there is no capital market involvement in forming and structuring
the portfolio, financial institutions may act based on the disclosed non-public information.
Issues of insider trading may however arise if non-public information is used to hedge
exposures through capital market activity, following the information bias between the in-
stitution and the market. Additional to moral aspects, severe penalties for such misconduct
motivates firms to restrict the access to non-public information for departments involved in
capital market activities. This is commonly referred to as building chinese walls and in the
case of portfolio management, common practice is to divide the business into what banks
refer to as private side and a public side. The former side makes credit assessments and
evaluations based on private information, whereas the latter acts on public information to
make decisions related to hedging exposures (Bouteillé and Coogan-Pushner, 2013, p. 230).
Although this organizational structure calls for some business activities to be conducted in
parallel business units, which may raise organizational costs, it serves to protect financial
institutions against penalties and reputation risk associated with insider trading.
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3.1.2 Origination and Limit Setting
We here regard sound practices for origination of transactions, which may serve to build a
strong foundational portfolio structure and help avoiding complications and costs associ-
ated with mitigating unwanted exposures.
3.1.2.1 Exposure and Concentration Limits
Setting a combination of qualitative and quantitative risk limits helps assuring that the
exposures taken on by an institution are in line with its appetite for risk and serves as a
first defense against unwanted portfolio structures.
As is stated in (Bouteillé and Coogan-Pushner, 2013, p. 218), limits should be set through
the expertise and judgement of senior management. In this way, the knowledge of experi-
enced professionals may serve to frame the institution’s risk strategy and support junior
management in their decision making. It is of importance that limits are clearly formulated
and enforced in a strict manner, as the motivation for their existence is to protect the in-
stitution from hazardous financial developments. Limits should however be flexible enough
to adapt to the development of the business and potential exceptions must be evaluated
by a group which does not hold responsibility for portfolio performance.
Table 3: Examples of limit factors, Burmeister (2009)
Limit Factor Risk Driver Description
Value at Risk /
Expected Shortfall
Overall Portfolio
Credit Risk
The most important limit according to Burmeister (2009), as it
incorporates several in-parameters reflecting both credit and mar-
ket risk.
Country Transfer Risk Limits with regards to foreign countries. Burmeister (2009)
suggest that countries within Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union
(EU) may be regarded as non-foreign following standardized reg-
ulatory frameworks and policies.
Sector Correlational Risk Due to high correlation and possible contagion effects, limiting ex-
posures to certain sectors may serve to protect against clustering
not captured by quantitative portfolio credit risk models.
Currency FX Risk Transactions in foreign currencies gives rise to foreign exchange
risk, which could either be limited or hedged.
Asset Class Operational and
Liquidity Risk
Limiting exposures to complex products / derivatives may serve
to avoid large exposures to financial asset classes which are hard to
price. An example is the recent collapse of the subprime mortgage
market, which initiated the latest global financial crisis.
Single Name
Exposure
Maximum Loss
(per Entity)
Restraining exposures to single entities may serve to decrease vul-
nerability against firm specific factors, which are hard to foresee.
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In order to assure a holistic protection against negative portfolio structures, limits should
be applied on a range of levels. Examples of possible limit factors and their corresponding
risk drivers are illustrated in table 3, following (Burmeister, 2009, p. 204).
3.1.2.2 Sound Practices in Originating Transactions
Building a robust credit portfolio generally starts with originating appropriate transac-
tions and avoiding engaging in those less favorable with respect to the overall strategy of
the business. We here consider an overview of sound practices for selecting what transac-
tions to originate, based on the checklist in (Bouteillé and Coogan-Pushner, 2013, p. 66-78).
When originating a transaction, it is crucial to make sure that the terms and conditions of
the transaction is thoroughly understood. Financial products tend to evolve through minor
changes rather than big leaps and unless the transaction details are approached with great
care, a financial institution may end up engaging in transactions which affect the overall
portfolio in ways they are not intended to.
Given that the terms and conditions have been thoroughly examined, it is of importance
to consider the suitability of the transaction with respect to the overall strategy of the
business. In the case of new transaction types, a holistic perspective may be achieved by
consulting lawyers, accountants and senior management representatives in order to assure
that no important aspects have been left out in the decision making. It is of great impor-
tance that the evaluation and approval processes are well documented in order to assure
transparency.
Attention has to be payed to how the transaction conforms with exposure and concen-
tration limits and in the event of a limit breach, aspects such as client relationships and
other non-credit related value creators have to be taken into account in order to evaluate
whether an exception shall be made or not. The capacity for taking on other transactions,
which may contribute better to the portfolio risk/return profile, also have to be considered
when evaluating the suitability of a credit with respect to the overall portfolio.
As credit risk is not static, originators must consider whether the institution has the pos-
sibility to surveillance the exposure throughout its life-time. Keeping a dialog with the
departments responsible for quantitative modeling and credit risk monitoring may here
serve to connect front and back end activities and help an institution to keep their moni-
toring activities up to date, in order to avoid declining favorable transactions due to lack
of expertise. If appropriate surveillance is available, further attention should be paid to
the availability of suitable mitigation tools and exit strategies, such that the institution is
in power of reducing the exposure in the event of monitoring activities indicating increased
risk for negative outcomes.
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Bouteillé and Coogan-Pushner (2013) underline the importance of keeping possible in-
formation asymmetries between seller and buyer in mind, in order to avoid engaging into
transaction with hidden flaws. Furthermore, it is suggested that the originator should keep
informed about the transaction after conclusion of negotiations in order to make sure that
the terms and conditions of the finalized deal reflects those agreed on at the negotiation
table in a well structured and transparent manner.
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3.1.3 Tools for Credit Risk Mitigation
We here regard financial instruments and methodologies commonly used for mitigating
credit exposures and rebalancing credit portfolios. The information presented mainly fol-
lows the discussions of mitigation tools in Hünseler (2013), Saunders et al. (2007) and
Bouteillé and Coogan-Pushner (2013).
3.1.3.1 Assignments
Assignments without recursion16 refers to loan sales where loans are being permanently
transferred from the balance sheet of the seller to that of the buyer. In this process, all
obligations of the loan seller terminates and the claim on the counter-party is transferred to
the buyer, which is favorable from a risk mitigation perspective. Assignments are dependent
on the allowance of loan documentations, which may include clauses giving borrowers veto
against loan sales or restricting the institution classes to which loans may be sold. Although
effectively transferring exposures to the market, assignments may harm client relationships
if not handled with care.
3.1.3.2 Participations
Participations are tools for sub-contracting loans to third party investors in an openly
disclosed or silent manner. In unfunded participations, the sub-contractor guarantees to
partly cover potential borrower defaults, whereas funded participations implies that the
sub-contractor participates in the funding of the loan by transferring funds to the origi-
nator. In both cases, the sub-contractor is compensated by a share of revenue from the
underlying loan proportional to its participation. The sub-contractor is hence exposed to
the credit risk of both originator and borrower, although it only has a claim on the former.
Given that the sub-contractors have no contractual relation to the borrower, all loan ad-
ministration remains conducted by the originator. It is argued in (Hünseler, 2013, p. 216)
that this may cause an interest bias between the originator and the sub-contractor in the
event of the borrower experiencing financial stress, following that the former is responsible
for the client relationship and may have other incentives than purely economical influencing
its decision making. Furthermore, the sub-contractor must rely on the originator to mon-
itor the exposure and pass on relevant information in a timely manner17. Participations
may however give sub-contractors access to credit market investments without implying
an extensive administrative burden.
16Recourse refers to the ability of the buyer to put a loan back to the seller under certain conditions.
17In order to pass information to sub-contractors, a confidentiality agreements is generally established
between the parties.
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From a portfolio management perspective, participations are flexible with respect to el-
igible counter-parties and underlying assets while allowing for exposure mitigation without
affecting client relationships. The method display low degree of standardization, which
allows for tailored terms and conditions but also implies an extensive administrational
burden and long time to market. Furthermore, originators may need to seek participants
consent in order for changes in the underlying loan documentation to be carried out, which
restricts flexibility for the risk manager once a participation has been established.
3.1.3.3 Credit Default Swaps
A credit default swap (CDS) is an over-the-counter derivative that allows for the credit
exposure of a reference entity to be transferred from a protection buyer to a protection
seller in exchange for fixed periodic payments, referred to as a spread or premium. In the
event of the reference entity defaulting on its obligations, the protection seller compensates
the protection buyer in accordance with the outcome of a settlement process, which we will
consider briefly later in this section. The reference entity, which may be a corporation, a
sovereign or an asset backed security, serves as an underlying to the CDS without being
involved in (and possibly not aware of) the transactions implied by the contract18.
Even though CDS may serve to insure an institution against unwanted credit exposure,
it is not per definition a credit insurance. As opposed to insurances, a CDS is triggered
by a publicly observable event such as a bankruptcy or failure to deliver payments in due
time19, rather than by a realized loss of the protection buyer. This property implies that
CDS may compensate a protection buyer for a credit event to which it has no exposure,
enabling the instrument class to be used for speculative purposes.
In the early development of the instruments, a physical settlement took place in the event of
a CDS being triggered, meaning that the protection buyer would deliver the held security
to the protection seller and for this be compensated at par value. This process has however
often proved to be inconvenient as the nominal amount of outstanding CDS in many cases
has come to exceed that of the outstanding deliverable securities, causing bond squeezes20
to follow credit events. Given that bond squeezes marginalizes compensations, cash set-
tlements have increasingly come to replace physical settlements as markets have developed.
In a cash settlement, the protection buyer is compensated by par value minus an ex-
pected recovery value, which is set based on the assumption of the protection buyers
18This does however not hold for CDS with physical settlements, addressed later in this section, where the
claim on the reference entity is transferred to the protection seller.
19Further valid credit events may be debt restructuring, repudiation/moratorium, obligation acceleration
and obligation default depending on the terms and conditions of the CDS.
20The term bond squeeze refers to an inflation in the price of deliverable bonds stemming from protection
buyers rushing the market for a deliverable security following a credit event.
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having a senior unsecured claim on the reference entity. The expected recovery values
are determined through auctions supervised by the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA). As the structure of these auctions is of fairly high complexity, we do
not engage in a detailed description in this thesis.
Figure 3: Schematic overview of fundamental CDS mechanisms. This figure is an edited
version of that in (Bartlam and Artmann, 2006, p. 6)
The possibility of mitigating credit exposures without seeking the approval of a counter-
party, as is the case for cash settlements, may help to preserve client relationships and spare
business originators the trouble of telling clients that their credit is considered to have a
negative influence on the overall portfolio. CDS provide flexibility to the risk managers
toolbox and may be used for reducing concentrations and mitigating peak exposures in or-
der to bring the portfolio risk/return ratio closer to the efficient frontier. The instruments
may further serve as an insurance against deteriorating credit quality of a counter-party
prior to default, as the value of CDS rise with increasing risk of a triggering credit event.
Furthermore, CDS documentations have been standardized by ISDA to ensure liquidity
and transparency, which reduces the administrative burden and time to market.
There is however no guarantee that the recovery rate covers the full exposure of a protec-
38
tion buyer, as it is set uniformly for all CDS on a reference entity in the cash settlements.
This is referred to as basis risk and even though there is an upside of this coin, in the sense
that a protection buyer may be overly compensated with respect to the realized loss, port-
folio managers may be unwilling of baring the uncertainty. As derivatives are accounted
for mark-to-market, they may induce volatility to profit and loss statements, stemming
from market movements which are not necessarily linked to changes in the credit quality of
the underlying. Furthermore, engaging in a derivative transaction exposes the institution
to the counter-party risk of the protection seller, which must be taken into account when
evaluating the protection.
Since the introduction of the single name CDS in the early 1990s, the instrument cate-
gory has been expanded to include members with a variety of properties. We here consider
three CDS family members and their areas of application for managing credit risk.
Basket CDS: The underlying is a basket of reference entities and the swap is triggered
at the n-th credit event in the basket. This structure allows for protection against the
credit risk of several counter-parties while taking reference entity correlation into account.
Loan-Only CDS: The reference obligations are syndicated secured loans and the need for
separating loan-only CDS from regular single name CDS stems from the generally higher
recovery value implied by this property. Furthermore, loan-only CDS terminate if the ref-
erence loan is re-paid or no deliverable at the required seniority is outstanding (FINCAD).
CDS Index: The most liquid and standardized credit derivative, which generally trades
at lower spreads than regular single name CDS. The indices are mainly written on large,
publicly traded firms and may therefore serve as a proxy hedge for such obligors, although
caution has to be taken when estimating the correlation to the hedged exposure, due to
the considerable basis risk proxy hedges implies.
3.1.3.4 Financial Guarantees
A financial guarantee is a financial contract through which a guarantor insures the holder
against losses stemming from the failure of a debtor to make payments in due time. As op-
posed to CDS, these instruments are written on pre-specified payments and compensation
is triggered by realized losses rather than credit events. It follows from these properties
that the protection buyer must hold the security for which it is buying protection and can
not be overly compensated with respect to the insured payments.
Another significant difference to CDS is the level of standardization. As previously men-
tioned, CDS are standardized to a high degree to ensure liquidity, whereas financial guar-
antees are tailored contracts between two parties, which implies a greater flexibility in
39
formulating contract documentations. This flexibility does however come at the cost of
illiquidity and high process complexity, although the latter problem often is partly re-
solved through reformulation of standardized CDS documentations.
Given that financial guarantees are perfect hedges with respect to the credit event ’failure
to pay’, they qualify as collateral under IAS 39. This property implies that they do not
induce volatility on the profit and loss statement of the holder, as they do not have to be
accounted for mark-to-market (Hünseler, 2013, p. 130).
3.1.3.5 Securitizations
From a risk management perspective, securitizations are tools for mitigating exposures by
pooling and reselling assets of a certain class to investors. Practically, this is managed
through a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which is a shell company whose only cause for
existence is to issue securities. The SPV must be fully independent, such that no other
entity than the investors in the issued securities can have a claim on the company, and
management is outsourced to third party service providers.
The interest bearing debt securities issued by the SPV are typically structured into tranches.
This securitization scheme reflects a waterfall structure where the tranches with the highest
seniority experience the highest priority of being repaid in the event of default. Interest
payments are made to investors from an escrow account, in which income from the pooled
assets, as well as proceeds from security sales, is being held and invested. An overview of
basic securitization mechanisms is presented in figure 4.
Figure 4: Schematic overview of basic securitization mechanisms (Jobst, 2008, p. 48)
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Rather than engaging in a discussion spanning over all types of securitizations available, we
here restrict our focus to collateralized debt obligations (CDO) and collateralized loan obli-
gations (CLO) in particular. The term CDO refers to securitizations where the collateral
posted consist of debt securities, whereas CLO constitute a subcategory in which the debt
instruments are restricted to loans. The loan types posted as collateral are generally, but
not formally, restricted to leveraged loans and loans to small and medium sized enterprises.
In the event of exposures being transferred from the balance sheet of the originating insti-
tution to the SPV through an assignment, the responsibilities of the originating institution
terminates. This is referred to as cash-flow CDO and constitutes an ideal scenario for the
originator, considering that it implies full mitigation of the unwanted exposures.
Assignments are in many situations infeasible due to factors such as contractual premises
and customer relations, which has given rise to an alternative structure, synthetic CDO,
in which risk transfer is achieved through CDS written on the reference portfolio of pooled
assets. This implies that assets stays on the balance sheet of the originator, in contradiction
to the process described in figure 4. The full nominal of the pooled assets is generally not
covered, following that a simultaneous default on all assets is unlikely to occur under stable
economical conditions. This structure implies high flexibility and low process complexity
compared to cash-flow CDO, but also exposes the originator to credit and basis risk.
Table 4: Aspects of cash-flow and synthetic CDO Danske Bank (2014)
Property Cash-Flow Synthetic
Making Credit Capacity Available Yes Yes
Regulatory Equity Optimization Yes Yes
Refinancing Yes No
Portfolio Transfer Yes No
SPV Necessary Yes No
Balance Sheet Reduction Yes No
Cost High Average
Process Complexity High Average
Administrative Complexity High Average
Counter-Party Risk No Yes
Remaining Asset Ownership No Yes
Legal Matters - Documentation High Low
Requirements of Computer Systems High Low
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4 Analysis
4.1 Numerical Analysis of Credit Risk Models
We here evaluate the credit risk models previously presented in this study, with focus on
model accuracy and computational efficiency. The Pykhtin multi-factor adjustment is eval-
uated on portfolio level, whereas the evaluation of the Monte Carlo methods covers credit
risk estimation on sector and obligor level as well.
The main purpose is to examine how the numerical estimation techniques considered in
this study can be applied for gaining quantitative insight in credit portfolio risk profiles.
4.1.1 Numerical Analysis Setup
We here define a multi-factor model setup and a methodology for generating sample port-
folios. This setup is later used for evaluation of the previously presented credit risk models.
4.1.1.1 Defining a Multi-Factor Model Setup
Throughout this numerical analysis, we will use an underlying multi-factor model with the
following properties:
• Each sector is connected to a global ZN+1 and a sector specific {Zk}k=1...N
systematic risk factor,
• The systematic risk factor loadings {βk}k=1...N are homogenous within sectors.
In analogy with (3) and (4), we describe this multi-factor model mathematically as:
Xi = riYi +
√
1− r2i ξi, Yi, ξi ∼ N(0, 1), (92)
Yi = βk(i)ZN+1 +
√
1− β2k(i)Zk(i), Zk(i), ZN+1 ∼ N(0, 1), (93)
where the idiosyncratic shock, the composite risk factor and the systematic risk factors
are standard normal distributed, following the specification in section 2.1. This model has
been chosen as it gives rise to an intuitive correlational structure and simplifies generation
of concentrated portfolios. All sample portfolios considered in this evaluation have further
been divided into 5 sectors, without loss of generality.
The loss given default variables {LGDi}i=1...M are set to be deterministic and the com-
posite risk factor loadings {ri}i=1...M are assumed to follow the Basel II IRB risk weight
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function for corporate assets, as defined in (Genest and Brie, 2013, p. 14):
r2i = 0.12
(
1− e−50PDi
1− e−50
)
+ 0.24
(
1− 1− e
−50PDi
1− e−50
)
. (94)
All risk factor loadings, composite and systematic, are assumed positive and all Value at
Risk and Expected Shortfall figures are based on confidence level α = 99.9%.
4.1.1.2 Homogenous Sample Portfolio Structure
We define a structure for homogenous sample portfolios in which the exposure weights of
sectors 2− 5 are equal. This property can be described mathematically as:
wk =
1− w1
4 , for k = 2...5.
(95)
As can be seen in (95), this structure allows for concentrated portfolios to be created in a
simple manner. It is implied from the sector homogeneity that the sector exposure weights
are distributed equally across obligors. We describe this mathematically as:
wi = wk(i)
/
Mk(i) . (96)
It further follows from the homogenous structure that all other obligor specific parameters
equals a set of sector specific parameters, which are listed in table 5.
Table 5: Portfolio structure - Sector specific parameters
Property Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 5
Number of Obligors M M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Exposure Weight w w1 (1−w1)/4 (1−w1)/4 (1−w1)/4 (1−w1)/4
Probability of Default PD 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Loss Given Default E[LGD] 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
V[LGD] 0 0 0 0 0
Syst. Factor Loading β
√
0.5
√
0.5
√
0.5
√
0.5
√
0.5
The composite risk factor loadings {rk}k=1...N have been left out of the table since they
are implied from (94) and the sector specific default probabilities {PDk}k=1...N .
4.1.1.3 Heterogenous Sample Portfolio Structure
We introduce a heterogenous portfolio structure with sector averages equal to those of
the homogenous portfolio structure. In contrast to the homogenous case, the exposure
weights are distributed randomly across obligors through normalized weights. Additionally,
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independent draws from uniformly distributed random variables are added to the expected
loss given default and the probability of default for each obligor:
wi = wk(i)∆wi
/
M∑
i=1
∆wi, ∆wi ∼ U(0, 1),
E[LGDi] = E[LGDk(i)] + ∆LGDi, ∆LGDi ∼ U(−0.1, 0.1),
PDi = PDk(i) + ∆PDi, ∆PDi ∼ U(−0.01, 0.01).
(97)
In generating sample portfolios, the stochastic parameters are drawn once and saved in or-
der for all heterogenous portfolios to have the same basic set of obligor specific properties.
Furthermore, obligor specific composite risk factor loadings {ri}i=1...M given the generated
default probabilities are computed according to (94) and the sector specific parameters are
set equal to the homogenous case, which are to be seen in table 5.
4.1.2 The Pykhtin Multi-Factor Adjustment
We define 4 portfolios of each kind, homogenous and heterogenous, with M = 100 obligors
in each sector. In order to examine how effects of exposure concentration are captured by
the multi-factor adjustment, we let the exposure weight of sector 1 take values:
w11 = 0.2, w21 = 0.4, w31 = 0.6, w41 = 0.8. (98)
The standard Pykhtin model is referred to as Pykhtin I and we further derive a computa-
tionally cheaper Pykhtin II model by dividing each sector into two equally large homoge-
nous groups after probability of default, where the properties of each group are obtained
from exposure weighting21. In this setting, Value at Risk, Expected Shortfall and compu-
tational time for each combination of model and portfolio are presented in tables 6-7 along
with close to exact estimates from a Monte Carlo routine22.
For homogenous portfolios, Pykhtin II achieves very low computational time without com-
promising accuracy, as can be seen in table 6. This follows from the property of ho-
mogeneity, which implies that no information is discarded from grouping obligors after
default probabilities. Table 7 shows that the approximation remains highly accurate for
portfolio 1 (equally distributed exposures) in the heterogenous case, whereas estimates for
concentrated portfolios display larger deviations from the "true" Monte Carlo estimates.
21This approach is close to the methodology suggested by Hibbeln (2010), described in section 2.2.2.5. The
difference is that we do not apply a discrete scale for default probabilities in this thesis.
22A two-step importance sampling routine with 100 000 iterations denoted MC here serves as a benchmark.
It is assumed that this number of iterations gives a sufficient level of convergence for the estimates to be
regarded as "true values" for these portfolios.
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Table 6: Homogenous portfolios: Value at Risk and Expected Shortfall
Measure Model Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4
Value at Risk (%) Pykhtin I 3.17 3.64 4.42 5.33
Pykhtin II 3.17 3.64 4.42 5.33
MC 3.18 3.65 4.42 5.33
Expected Shortfall (%) Pykhtin I 3.71 4.27 5.21 6.30
Pykhtin II 3.71 4.27 5.21 6.30
MC 3.73 4.29 5.21 6.31
Computational Time (s) Pykhtin I 108 108 107 111
Pykhtin II 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
MC 226 235 242 239
Table 7: Heterogenous portfolios: Value at Risk and Expected Shortfall
Measure Model Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4
Value at Risk (%) Pykhtin I 3.11 3.57 4.34 5.24
Pykhtin II 3.10 3.53 4.27 5.13
MC 3.11 3.58 4.35 5.24
Expected Shortfall (%) Pykhtin I 3.64 4.19 5.12 6.22
Pykhtin II 3.63 4.15 5.04 6.09
MC 3.64 4.20 5.13 6.21
Computational Time (s) Pykhtin I 108 109 108 111
Pykhtin II 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05
MC 225 229 236 240
Value at Risk is further estimated with Pykhtin I & II at varying levels of systematic risk
factor loadings in order to examine model sensitivty to composite factor correlation. Each
homogenous and heterogenous portfolio 1-4 is here assigned the same β-values, ranging
from 0 to 1, and the results are presented in figure 5.
The Pykhtin I model show enhancements in accuracy with increasing composite factor cor-
relation and exposure concentration, which can be explained by the asymptotic elimination
of the systematic term in the multi-factor adjustment. As correlation and concentration
increase, the underlying model converges to a single-factor model, reducing the estimation
error of the multi-factor adjustment to that of the idiosyncratic term23. It can be seen in
figure 5b that the Pykhtin I model sets an upper bound for the accuracy of Pykhtin II,
which is expected given the crude approximation of averaging obligor parameters within
sector groups. It is reasonable to think that the averaging process causes the excessive
negative offset displayed in figure 5b for Pykhtin II and that a Monte Carlo routine would
produce similar results for default probability weighted portfolios.
23This observation is in line with that in (Pykhin, 2004, p. 88).
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We further vary the sector sizes simultaneously in a range between 10 and 100 obligors for
each of the portfolios and examine how such transitions affect the accuracy in computing
Value at Risk. As can be seen in figure 6, the model performance is stable across sector
sizes almost independent of sector exposure weights, where the only significant deviation
from the Monte Carlo estimates occur for homogenous portfolio 4 with 10 obligors. This is
an important result, which shows that the idiosyncratic part of the multi-factor adjustment
is highly accurately describing the behavior it was designed to capture.
The accuracy of the Pykhtin II model is, as previously mentioned, highly dependent on the
applied averaging method and even though it does not guarantee precise results, there are
reasons for seeking very fast ways of determining the region of Value at Risk and Expected
Shortfall. In section 4.1.3, we evaluate the importance sampling methods by Glasserman
and Li (2005), which demand for an accuracy threshold to be set at the initiation of a
simulation. In estimating Value at Risk, one may not know the region of interest in ad-
vance and the Pykhtin II model may thus serve as a time effective method for setting an
approximate accuracy threshold.
Given the multi-factor model setting considered in this evaluation, the Pykhtin I model dis-
plays high accuracy and does not suffer from simulation noise, which is the case for Monte
Carlo methods. As we have previously noted in section 2.2.2.5, the model computational
time is approximately square proportional to the number of obligors in a portfolio, mak-
ing it suitable for Value at Risk and Expected Shortfall computations for small portfolios.
The model is however limited by restricting assumptions on the underlying model setting,
which does not allow more complex multi-factor model structures including e.g. correlated
systematic risk factors.
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Figure 5: Value at Risk computed with Pykhtin I and Pykhtin II for varying levels of
composite factor correlation and 100 obligors per sector. A two-step importance sampling
routine with 200 000 iterations is used to compute the Monte Carlo figures.
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Figure 6: Value at Risk computed with Pykhtin I and Pykhtin II for varying sector sizes.
A two-step importance sampling routine with 200 000 iterations is used to compute the
Monte Carlo figures.
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4.1.3 Monte Carlo Methods
We here consider heterogenous portfolio 1 from the evaluation of the Pykhtin multi-factor
adjustment in section 4.1.2, with obligor specific properties as displayed in table (97).
The portfolio loss distribution is simulated using the Monte Carlo estimators presented in
section 2.3. For simplicity of notation, the following estimator descriptions are introduced:
CMC: The Crude Monte Carlo estimator
ISMC -MS: The risk factor mean-shift importance sampling Monte Carlo estimator
ISMC -ET: The exponential twisting importance sampling Monte Carlo estimator
ISMC -TS: The two-step importance sampling Monte Carlo estimator
The two-step importance sampling estimator here denotes the risk factor mean-shift and
exponential twisting techniques combined, as described in algorithm 3. For each estimator,
we simulate a range of loss probabilities P (L > x), which are presented in figure 7 along
with corresponding confidence intervals at 95% confidence level.
Rather than estimating parameters µ∗ and θx for all loss levels x, we define an accuracy
threshold xa for which the parameter values are estimated24. Following (72), low losses
become rare events when exponential twisting is applied, as can be seen in figure 7. We
can however be certain, before initiating a simulation, that this region does not cover the
loss level xa for which µ∗ and θx are estimated, which explains the term accuracy threshold.
Given that tail loss probabilities are of particular interest, we have here taken advantage
of the Pykhtin II model’s computational efficiency when setting the accuracy threshold,
xa = V aRPykhtin II = 0.031. This computation approximately takes 0.05 seconds and is
thus a convenient way of assuring accuracy when estimating tail probabilities25.
A significant variance reduction is obtained from shifting the risk factor expected values,
which is intuitive considering that this method serves to reduce the probability of positive
market scenarios. The confidence interval of the Crude Monte Carlo method strongly di-
verges for loss rates larger than 0.03, whereas methods including factor mean-shifts display
stable confidence intervals until 0.12. This comes to a small (fixed) computational cost of
3 seconds for finding the risk factor expected value at the start of the simulation.
24This serves to significantly improve computational efficiency.
25As can be seen in figure 7c, higher accuracy in the region of Value at Risk (x = 0.0311) can be achieved
by raising the accuracy threshold. We do however argue that the V aRPykhtin II serves as a reasonable
choice in case the loss distribution is unknown a priori simulation.
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(d) ISMC -TS: 227 seconds
Figure 7: P (L > x) computed with 4 different Monte Carlo estimators.
The number of iterations is set to 100 000 for each estimator.
The property of shifting the conditional expected loss rate described in (72) is explicitly
reflected in figure 7c, where accuracy has been concentrated in a region close to the accu-
racy threshold. The most computationally expensive part of any scenario26, all estimators
considered, is the estimation of parameter θx. Given that default probabilities only are
twisted in scenarios where the conditional expected loss rate is smaller than the accuracy
threshold, shifting the risk factor expected values helps eliminating several optimization
procedures for finding θx. This explains the significant decrease in computational time
obtained from applying a risk factor mean-shift to the method of exponential twisting.
26The optimization procedure for finding a shifted risk factor mean µ∗ is carried out before the first iteration
and does thus not affect the average scenario computational time.
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In order to examine convergence rates of the Monte Carlo estimators, we estimate Value
at Risk for a varying number of iterations ranging from 1 000 to 100 000 for the previously
considered portfolio. Two tests are performed in which the systematic risk factor correla-
tion is set to 0.25 and 0.75, as βk are assigned values
√
0.25 and
√
0.75 for all sectors. The
results are displayed in figure 8.
All Monte Carlo methods display a faster rate of convergence for the highly correlated
portfolio than for the less correlated. The exponential twisting estimator does not signifi-
cantly outperform the Crude Monte Carlo estimator, which partly is a result of the choice
of accuracy threshold. Raising the accuracy threshold would enhance the performance of
the exponential twisting estimator, but we argue that this result serves a purpose in dis-
playing the robustness of the estimators with respect to the initial guess of the threshold.
In this sense, the factor mean-shift based estimators both display a robust performance
with respect to the information (the Pykhtin II Value at Risk estimate) about the loss rate
distribution that is fed into the estimators a priori simulation.
Furthermore, it can be seen that the two-step Monte Carlo estimator outperforms the
factor mean-shift estimator at low risk factor correlation and low numbers of iterations.
Given that estimators which do not apply exponential twisting are significantly faster than
those that does, a tradeoff arises where this variance reduction could be achieved within
the same computational time by raising the number of iterations for the factor mean-shift
estimator.
Component Value at Risk is computed with 1 000 000 iterations for each obligor in the
sample portfolio and the estimated values are presented with corresponding 95% confi-
dence intervals in figure 9. Obligors have been sorted by magnitude of component Value
at Risk in order to give the graph an increasing slope, which makes it simple to read and
understand. The lower bounds in the confidence intervals are restricted to be larger than
or equal to zero, as we here assume that no obligor has a hedging effect on the portfolio.
Estimating component Value at Risk is computationally demanding following the con-
straint in (88), which causes all scenarios with portfolio losses insufficiently close to Value
at Risk to be discarded. This gives rise to a substantial estimator variance for the CMC
estimator, following that valid scenarios are rare in this setting. Shifting the risk factor
expected values does however drastically reduce estimator variance and figure 9 shows that
the estimator ISMC -MS provides the highest accuracy/computational time ratio of all
estimators. We further observe that computational time increase with number of valid sce-
narios, as this implies an increase in the average number of matrix-operations per iteration.
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(a) Convergence test with risk factor correlation set to 0.25.
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Figure 8: Convergence tests displaying Value at Risk for each Monte Carlo estimator.
The number of iterations ranges from 1 000 to 100 000 with step size 1 000.
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(d) ISMC -TS: 3143 seconds
Figure 9: Component Value at Risk estimated for each obligor in the sample portfolio.
The number of iterations is set to 1 000 000 and the tolerance  in (87) is set
to V aR/100 for each estimator.
The drastic offset in computational time for the exponential twisting estimators stems from
the technique of shifting the default probabilities (and thus seeking θx) in every iteration,
which is discussed in section 2.3.3.2. We do however note that shifting the risk factor
expected values reduces the computational time of the exponential twisting estimator by
eliminating part of the time allocated to the θx-solver.
We proceed by comparing the 50 largest values of component Value at Risk to incre-
mental Value at Risk (the change in portfolio Value at Risk when removing a position) for
the corresponding obligors. All figures are computed using the ISMC - TS estimator and
the results are displayed in figure 10, along with a linear regression.
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Figure 10: Component Value at Risk vs Incremental Value at Risk.
Incremental Value at Risk is computed using the ISMC -TS estimator with 800 000
iterations and the component Value at Risk figures corresponds to those in figure 9d.
Linear regression: CVaR = 1.017 · IVaR + 2.061 · 10−3, R2 = 0.9068.
The approximation in (91) proves quite accurate, although the absolute value of component
Value at Risk is consistently larger than or equal to that of incremental Value at Risk27.
In the light of the computational effort needed to accurately compute incremental Value
at Risk, it is reasonable to consider component Value at Risk an efficient indicator of a
portfolios largest exposures. Furthermore, component Value at Risk can be interpreted as
the contribution of an obligor or sector to the diversified portfolio Value at Risk and the
properties of exact additivity and decomposability (81) makes it a convenient measure for
assessing risk on obligor as well as sector level.
In conclusion, we demonstrate in tables 8 - 10 how the Monte Carlo methods regarded
in this study can be applied for a comprehensive overview of a portfolios risk profile.
27This follows as the first order derivative neglects diversification/concentration effects stemming from
adding/removing a position.
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Table 8: Risk profile - Portfolio level
Measure Sector Total % Expected % Systematic % Idiosyncratic
Value at Risk (%) All 3.11 13.94 75.40 10.66
Expected Shortfall (%) All 3.64 11.92 77.90 10.18
Table 9: Risk profile - Sector level
Measure Sector Total % Expected % Systematic % Idiosyncratic
Component VaR (%) Sector 1 0.81 13.84 75.48 10.68
Sector 2 0.29 13.49 78.16 8.35
Sector 3 0.79 14.00 74.64 11.36
Sector 4 0.32 13.65 77.27 9.08
Sector 5 0.90 14.21 74.45 11.34
Component ES (%) Sector 1 0.95 11.76 77.75 10.49
Sector 2 0.35 11.33 80.79 7.88
Sector 3 0.91 12.14 77.28 10.58
Sector 4 0.38 11.56 80.01 8.42
Sector 5 1.05 12.21 76.84 10.95
Table 10: Risk profile - Obligor level (The 10 largest exposures)
Obligor ID Sector Incremental VaR (%) Component VaR (%) Component ES (%)
408 Sector 5 2.45 · 10−2 2.85 · 10−2 3.17 · 10−2
481 Sector 5 2.42 · 10−2 2.69 · 10−2 3.05 · 10−2
478 Sector 5 2.21 · 10−2 2.38 · 10−2 2.73 · 10−2
439 Sector 5 1.82 · 10−2 2.28 · 10−2 2.60 · 10−2
403 Sector 5 1.85 · 10−2 2.28 · 10−2 2.56 · 10−2
85 Sector 1 2.02 · 10−2 2.26 · 10−2 2.56 · 10−2
491 Sector 5 1.91 · 10−2 2.14 · 10−2 2.39 · 10−2
233 Sector 3 1.96 · 10−2 2.13 · 10−2 2.49 · 10−2
26 Sector 1 1.77 · 10−2 1.98 · 10−2 2.23 · 10−2
453 Sector 5 1.80 · 10−2 1.93 · 10−2 2.30 · 10−2
Remark 5 The figures in table 10 show signs of estimator variance, which is a result of the
limited computational power at hand when conducting this study. The estimates on sector
level have however been confirmed accurate and it is reasonable to think that a financial
institution would have the hardware needed to achieve accurate estimates on obligor level
using these methods. This example serves a purpose in demonstrating how the models
and risk type decompositions regarded in this study can be applied to examine risk-type
contributions, sector concentrations and single name exposures in a holistic manner.
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5 Discussion
The Pykhtin models and the risk factor mean-shift based Monte Carlo techniques both
display great performance throughout the numerical analysis in section 4.1. These results
must however be interpreted in relation to the setting in which the models have been tested,
considering the simplifying assumptions which have been made through out this thesis.
It is reasonable to think that the performance of the factor mean-shift Monte Carlo method
would be negatively affected by the introduction of stochastic loss given default variables,
following that the risk factor expected values are shifted a priori simulation. The estima-
tor is therefore not able to account for scenario specific changes in the loss given default
figures, which may cause the risk factor mean-shift to become sub-optimal with respect
to the obligor specific properties in the scenarios. This should however not influence the
performance of the exponential twisting estimator, as the default probabilities are twisted
in each scenario, which allows for this estimator to account for scenario specific properties.
The Pykhtin model accounts for stochastic loss given default through the variable variance,
but makes no further assumptions on the distribution of these variables. It is therefore
reasonable to think that the performance of the model is dependent on the distribution
chosen to model the loss given default variables. The computational time of the Pykhtin
model is however independent of the choice of distribution, whereas the set of possible
scenarios in the simulation based techniques is extended if stochastic loss given default is
introduced. This may imply lower convergence rates for the simulation based methods and
increase the relative computational efficiency of the Pykhtin model in such a setting.
Furthermore, the loss given default variables are assumed independent with regards to the
systematic risk factors in the underlying multi-factor model. This is somewhat counter-
intuitive, as it is reasonable to think that harsh market conditions implies low recovery rates
through effects of contagion. In the Basel II framework, this simplification is compensated
for through the use of loss given default estimates which "reflect economic downturn condi-
tions where necessary to capture the relevant risks" (Hibbeln, 2010, p. 40). Following that
the approach is in line with Basel II, we do not engage in further discussions on this topic.
The main limit factor in estimating component value at risk has been the RAM-memory,
following the large matrices needed for storing scenario specific losses on obligor level.
Given that scenario specific data only is necessary for computing the estimator variance, it
is however possible to enhance the component Value at Risk estimator efficiency through
addition of scenario losses, which reduces the matrix-size required for storage according to:
Number of Scenarios ·Number of Obligors −→ Number of Obligors.
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As previously stated, this efficiency comes at the cost of neglecting the estimator variance.
The factor mean-shift Monte Carlo estimator provides the highest accuracy/computational
time ratio, whereas the two-step Monte Carlo estimator provides the highest accuracy with
respect to allocated RAM-memory. This makes the latter a suitable tool in situations where
internal memory, rather than computational time, constitutes the main constraint.
Fully covering active credit portfolio management is challenging and we have in this thesis
taken a quantitative perspective. The idea was initially to provide a wide scope of portfolio
management, ranging from computationally fast models to risk mitigation strategies, but
as complexity grew in the credit risk modeling part of the project, a decision had to be
taken on whether to equally balance these parts or put focus on the risk modeling part.
The choice of the second option was motivated partly by the author’s technical background
and partly by a wish to find a model sophisticated enough to be practiced by a Nordic bank.
In conclusion, we note that the factor mean-shift based Monte Carlo methods are granular
enough to cover all aspects of concentration risk regarded in the problem definition (in
a setting where the systematic risk factors are connected to industries and geographical
regions) with high accuracy and within reasonable computational time.
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6 Conclusion
The Pykhtin models may serve to give a simplistic overview of portfolio risk profiles at low
computational cost while taking granularity into account. They are further suitable for
determining the accuracy threshold for the simulation based Monte Carlo models in the
case of loss distribution tail regions being unknown a priori simulation.
The importance sampling Monte Carlo techniques allows for accurate estimation of con-
centration risk with respect to single entities, industrial sectors and geographical regions,
which may serve to enhance awareness of concentration risk in loan portfolios.
Furthermore, the risk factor mean-shift estimator may, through a drastic decrease in com-
putational time in comparison to the Crude Monte Carlo method, enable financial institu-
tions to frequently update their risk estimates and better incorporate quantitative aspects
into an active portfolio management setting.
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A Risk Measures
A.1 Value at Risk
Value at Risk is here defined as a quantile of a loss distribution, which may be expressed
as the smallest value x such that the probability of encountering a loss of magnitude x or
larger is smaller than 1− α. This can be formulated as:
V aRα(L) = inf{x : P (L > x) ≤ 1− α} = inf{x : FL(x) ≥ α}. (99)
A.2 Marginal Value at Risk
Marginal Value at Risk is here defined as the change in portfolio Value at Risk follow-
ing a marginal change in the exposure weight wi of obligor i. This can be formulated
mathematically in the following way:
MV aR iα(L) =
∂V aR portfolioα (L)
∂wi
. (100)
A.3 Component Value at Risk
Component Value at Risk is here defined as the contribution of obligor i to the diversified
portfolio Value at Risk, which may be written as the product of the obligor exposure weight
and marginal Value at Risk:
CV aR iα(L) = wi
∂V aR portfolioα (L)
∂wi
. (101)
A.4 Incremental Value at Risk
Incremental Value at Risk is here defined as the absolute difference in portfolio Value at
Risk which stems from adding or removing position i. We describe this mathematically as:
IV aR± iα (L) =
∣∣∣V aR portfolio± iα (L)− V aR portfolioα (L) ∣∣∣ . (102)
A.5 Expected Shortfall
Expected shortfall is here defined as the expected loss conditional on the loss rate being
larger than or equal to Value at Risk. The may be described mathematically as.
ESα(L) = E[L |L ≥ qα(L)] = 11− α
∫ 1
α
V aRu(L) du. (103)
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A.6 Expected Loss
The expected loss is defined as the unconditional expectation of the product of the exposure
weight, loss given default and probability of default. We describe this mathematically in
the following way:
EL = E[w · LGD · PD]. (104)
A.7 Economic Capital
Economic capital is defined as the unexpected part of Value at Risk. We describe this
mathematically as:
ECα = V aRα − EL. (105)
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